Court Opinions

Paragon v. Peachtree Condominium Assoc., 202 N.J. 415 (2010)

This case involved a construction project wherein the contractor filed an action seeking damages from the condominium association regarding certain unpaid fees allegedly owed to the contractor for completed construction work. The condominium association filed a third-party complaint against the engineering firm, alleging the engineering firm performed incomplete and defective design work in connection with the project. When no affidavit of merit was served within 120 days of engineering firm’s filing of it answer to the third-party complaint, the engineering firm a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint pursuant to the affidavit of merit statute.

The Superior Court, Law Division granted the motion. The condominium association moved for leave to appeal, which the Superior Court, Appellate Division, denied. However, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and summarily remanded the matter to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, at 406 N.J.Super. 568, 968 A.2d 752, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the matter to the Law Division.

The condominium association petitioned for the Supreme Court for certification, which was granted. The Supreme Court held that: (1) failure to hold a conference pursuant to Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates did not toll the statutory time frames for filing affidavit of merit in action alleging professional malpractice, abrogating Saunders ex rel. Saunders v. Capital Health Sys., 398 N.J.Super. 500, 942 A.2d 142, and (2) confusion over the effects of failure to hold a Ferreira conference amounted to extraordinary circumstance that warranted relief from dismissal.

Paragon v. Peachtree Condominium Assoc., 406 N. J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 2009)

This case involved a construction project wherein the contractor filed an action seeking damages from the condominium association regarding certain unpaid fees allegedly owed to the contractor for completed construction work. The condominium association filed a third-party complaint against the engineering firm, alleging that the engineering firm performed incomplete and defective design work in connection with the project. When no affidavit of merit was served within 120 days of the engineering firm filing its answer to the third-party complaint, the engineering firm filed a motion to dismissal the third-party complaint pursuant to the affidavit of merit statute.

The Superior Court, Law Division, granted the engineering firm’s motion to dismiss. The condominium association moved for leave to appeal, which the Superior Court, Appellate Division, denied. However, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and summarily remanded the matter to the Superior Court, Appellate Division to rule on the appeal.

The Superior Court, Appellate Division held that: (1) application of the doctrine of substantial compliance with the affidavit of merit was not warranted; (2) extraordinary circumstances were not presented that excused the condominium association’s failure to comply with the affidavit of merit statute; (3) a trial court’s failure to schedule the required case management conference does not toll the statutory deadline or otherwise excuse a malpractice claimant’s noncompliance with the affidavit of merit statute; and (4) determination that the condominium association failed to comply with affidavit of merit statute warranted remand for consideration of the condominium association’s common-knowledge argument.

Trinity Church v. Lawson Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2007)

The Church filed a suit against the architect and several other defendants based on alleged construction defects. The Superior Court, Law Division entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on grounds that the suit was filed beyond the statute of limitations. The Church appeal the dismissal.​

The Superior Court, Appellate Division held that: (1) contract clause, providing that the statute of limitations for any cause of action arising under the contract would run from the date of “substantial completion,” was valid and enforceable under Pennsylvania law, and (2) the Church was not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period.

Accordingly the dismissal was affirmed.